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ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to investigate the bases for resistance to arbitration in general -and 
investor arbitration in particular- focusing on the way in which arbitral tribunals deal with notions 
of public interest and the public good. The paper hypothesises that while courts have within their 
terms of reference the capacity to consider notions of public interest, arbitral tribunals do not. It is 
this core difference in the scope of decision making between the two bodies that could render 
privately organised dispute resolution unsuitable for disputes that have public aspects, like investor-
state disputes. The paper discusses the meaning of public interest and the public good as found in 
the literature. It then proceeds to consider how tribunals in the investment field have dealt with 
these concepts. This leads to a conclusion urging not abandonment of arbitration as a component 
of dispute resolution, but caution. It is argued that unchecked growth in private dispute resolution 
can threaten perceptions of legitimacy and democratic accountability. The paper adopts a socio-
legal methodology in considering the effect of legal mechanisms on social and political phenomena. 
It is also informed by a law and economics methodology in addressing impacts of dispute resolution 
mechanisms on economic efficiency. The contribution of the paper rests on theorising motivations 






Dispute resolution methods have always been a rather esoteric lawyer concern, rarely coming 
to the forefront of public debate. This has recently changed due to the proposal that an Investor 
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) clause is included in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) the United States and Europe are currently negotiating. Suddenly, who is 
responsible for adjudicating disputes seems as important, or worthy of discussion, as the 
outcome of any decision making. The ISDS proposal has motivated a large number of 
commentators, activists and NGOs to become very involved in a discussion on the role of courts 
versus private tribunals and has revitalised campaigns against investor arbitration. Such 
campaigns are not new, as concern about entrusting large private-public disputes to private 
decision makers has always raised concerns. Nonetheless, we are currently in a political 
environment where resistance to globalisation (to use this rather old fashioned term) or global 
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capitalism (to use a trendier one) seems to involve increasingly debates as to the place of 
tribunals and courts in a democratic society. Is it a good idea to allow disputes between (usually) 
large multinationals and (often) small states to be settled by arbitration? Is it sensible to allow 
for private resolution of disputes with a public element? Is it desirable to de-localise disputes 
that have implications for public policy? Is it democratically acceptable that private, 
contractually based bodies determine the boundaries of sovereign discretion? 
This paper seeks to unpack the basis for resistance to arbitration in general -and investor 
arbitration in particular- focusing on a single key issue that often gets obscured in the reciprocal 
shouting match that has engulfed the TTIP debate. This issue is the way in which arbitral 
tribunals deal with notions of public interest and the public good. The hypothesis of the paper 
is that while courts have within their terms of reference the ability, indeed the obligation, to 
consider notions of public interest, arbitral tribunals do not. It is this core difference in the scope 
of decision making between the two bodies that could render privately organised dispute 
resolution unsuitable for disputes that have public aspects, like investor-state disputes. 
The paper offers a presentation of the meaning of public interest and the public good as 
found in the literature. It then proceeds to consider how tribunals in the investment field have 
dealt with these concepts. This leads to a conclusion urging not abandonment of ISDS as a 
component of dispute resolution, but caution. The result of this study is that unchecked growth 
in private dispute resolution can threaten perceptions of legitimacy and democratic 
accountability long before it actually limits sovereign discretion beyond the point that states 
can determine and defend notions of the public good. 
 
2. PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
Before engaging in a reflection on the appropriate forum for deciding disputes with a public 
element, we need to define what we mean by this public element. What does it mean to say that 
an issue is one of public interest or concerns the common good? Indeed the very concept of 
public interest has been characterised as nebulous1 and subjective, allowing anyone to project 
their own views and pre-conceptions. The above is complicated even further by the inconsistent 
use of the terms public interest and public good, that most accept as synonymous (as is the case 
with this paper). A standard view of the public good as a normative concept denotes goods that 
serve everyone in a community and its institutions, transcending particular groups and 
generations.2 A discussion of public interest and good often becomes a journey of discovery 
of public values. William Eskridge has written that public values are legal norms and principles 
that form fundamental underlying precepts for our polity-background norms that contribute to 
                                                 
1 Frank J. Sorauf, ‘The Public Interest Reconsidered’, The Journal of Politics, 1957, 19(4): 616-39, at 618. 
2 Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Common Good’, in Michael T. Gibbons, (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Political Thought (1st 
ed., John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 1-7, available at 
https://icps.gwu.edu/sites/icps.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Common%20Good.Etzioni.pdf (accessed 16 March 2016). 
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-and result from- the moral development of our political community. Public values appeal to 
conceptions of justice and the common good, not to the desires of just one person or group.3 
Perhaps one way to define the public interest or good (used here as being synonymous) 
is by distinguishing them from individual rights and liberties. The pluralist tradition of political 
science (largely adopting the assumptions of neoclassical economics) tends to diminish the 
importance of the public interest, and in some cases criticises such a notion as implicitly anti-
democratic.4 Criticizing top-down notions of the public interest and the common good as 
inviting authoritarianism at the expense of democracy is in fact common. Such logic has been 
often encountered in the process of post-communist transformation. For example, taking Adam 
Smith’s theory of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market and employing it to public institutions even 
led the reform team that dominated policy making after 1991 in Russia to suggest that the laws 
of the market could be used to resolve the administrative chaos of the Russian state (at the initial 
phases of transition to a market economy) by encouraging competition between state 
institutions.5 This curious regulatory arbitrage, as it is called, is seen by some as a superior way 
to achieve socially beneficial outcomes rather than relying oin a democratic state –or a 
paternalistic ruler- that promulgates rules. It has been argued6 that the tug of war between 
private interest groups produces public policy superior to anything that would be reached by 
the state enforcing its own formulation of the public interest. 
This paper adopts the view that the public good is something that can legitimately be 
determined by a government having a democratic mandate to govern. Indeed, such capacity for 
the sovereign is assumed by courts when they have to determine issues of public policy, as they 
seek to discover the objectives of the legislator in promulgating rules. The multiple 
interpretations of the public interest and its uses inevitably become more specific in the context 
of dispute resolution. We now turn to the way the courts and subsequently tribunals have 
interpreted these notions, starting with an investigation of the tension that exists between 
judicial decision making and sovereign discretion. 
 
3. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
What should the role of dispute resolution in relation to state action and sovereign discretion 
be? Taking a restrictive view of the role of the state (as the facilitator of market processes), 
suggests a particular attitude on the part of institutions involved in dispute resolution. This is 
consistent with a neoclassical view of regulation which focuses on market failure and sees the 
role of government as mitigating such failure or alternatively, in the absence of inefficiencies, 
as designing the least-costly methods of redistributing resources.7 In such an environment, 
                                                 
3 William N. Eskridge Jr., ‘Public Values in Statutory Interpretation’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1989, 
137(4): 1007-104, 1008.  
4 Amitai Etzioni (2015), supra note 2, at 4. 
5 Ioannis Glinavos, Neoliberalism and the Law in Post Communist Transition: The Evolving Role of Law in Russia’s 
Transition to Capitalism (Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2010), 95. 
6 Frank J. Sorauf, ‘The Conceptual Muddle’, in Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Nomos V: The Public Interest (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1962), 183-90. 
7 Harry Trebing, ‘Regulation of industry: an institutionalist approach’, Journal of Economic Issues, 1987, 21 (4): 
1707-35, 1716. 
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courts are preoccupied with assuring the legitimacy of state assertion of power. This was true 
in the era of the New Deal in the USA, as Rabin suggests8, but it was also true in the pre 
financial crisis period (before 2008) in the domain of investor protection. In investment cases 
specifically, a discourse on rights -and by extension legitimate expectations- dominates 
thinking, with the state usually portrayed as the aggressor and the investor as the victim of any 
changes in policy. This is not to say that the above is not factually true in many cases, yet it is 
misleading to view rights (for the investor) and the public good (for the state) as mutually 
exclusive, as the examples discussed below demonstrate. 
The ideas outlined so far suggest that courts act as defenders of private interests against 
state intervention, but is this assumption borne out by the evidence? US case-law predating the 
Second World War demonstrates that while a sovereign right to regulate was asserted in 
principle, it is also clearly delineated. Those in charge of dispute resolution between states and 
investors therefore were singularly focused on controlling the extent of state power over private 
parties. The emphasis of adjudication, much as it is today, was on the protection of ‘rights’. 
This conception of rights therefore could be used to chip away at sovereign authority and 
regulatory autonomy, when it was seen as a threat to market activity and choice. The impression 
of the courts as protectors of private rights vis-à-vis state imposition is not true of all courts in 
all circumstances however, especially in what is perhaps mis-perceived as the height of laissez-
faire before the onset of the New Deal in the 1930s in the USA.9 Two examples, from US 
courts, help illustrate why viewing courts in the early 20th century as guardians of private rights 
should not be interpreted as an exclusion of notions of the public good from judicial thinking. 
In Munn v. Illinois,10 the court noted that a grain warehouse firm stood in the very 
gateway of commerce and took a toll from all who passed, and as such their business was a 
legitimate target for regulation. The court referred to English common law, quoted Lord Hale11 
and established what has come to be recognised as the public utility principle.12 This suggested 
that when one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, 
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for 
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. The court noted that the right 
to regulate may not be made so by the Constitution or a statute, but it is by the facts. Implicit in 
this judgment was a view of law as something more than a dispute settling mechanism. Law 
came to be seen as a dynamic tool of social control and a facilitator of economic progress.13 In 
Nebbia v. New York,14 the Supreme Court in the spirit of Munn argued in favour of a wide 
scope for legitimate government intervention in the market, stating that even in industries that 
are not public utilities, the public interest still dictates their behaviour: The phrase ‘affected 
                                                 
8 Robert Rabin, ‘Legitimacy Discretion, and the Concept of Rights’, Yale Law Journal, 1983, 92(7): 1174-88, at 
1176. 
9 Ioannis Glinavos, Redefining the Market-State Relationship (Routledge, 2013), at 69. 
10 Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 US 113 
11 Hale, Lord Chief Justice. De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg.Law Tracts 78. 
12 William H. Melody (ed.), Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practice (Lyngby: Technical 
University of Denmark, 1997), at 12. 
13 Morton J. Horwitz, ‘The historical foundations of modern contract law’, Harvard Law Review, 1974, 87(5): 917-
56. 
14 Nebbia v. New York (1934) 291 US 502. 
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with a public interest’ can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for 
adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good. The court also noted that so far as the 
requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, 
a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public 
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. We can conclude 
therefore that while US courts always served the role of the guardian of private rights on the 
basis of the constitution, they still retained the ability to consider and give legal effect to public 
law interests including notions of the public good.  
By fast-forwarding from the beginning of the 20th, to the start of the 21st century, one 
could argue that an attitude to rights and limits on sovereign power had hardened in the pre- 
financial crisis years (from the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s till the middle of the first 
decade of the new century). Nonetheless, this seemed to come to an abrupt end with the 
financial crisis in 2008. It is proposed here that the demands of crisis response propelled 
thinking to a new era of concern for the public interest. Indeed history (at least jurisprudentially) 
seems to repeat itself, with the current debate on rights and state power mimicking that of the 
Public Interest Era of the 1970s in the USA. Mirroring perhaps the lack of significant reactions 
to the creation of regulatory agencies, like the Environmental Protection Agency in the early 
1970s in the USA, there were few challenges, at least initially, to the (albeit modest) desire to 
regulate in the immediate aftermath of the financial crash in 2009-10.  
A known example of this ‘return’ of regulation was the enactment of an extensive 
financial regulatory reform bill, named the Dodd-Frank Act. In some respects this Act set apart 
the reaction of the United States from that of Europe, where changes have been less wholesale, 
perhaps understandably considering the disorganising effects of the sovereign debt crisis that 
has plagued Europe since 2010. By the time of its final passage, the Dodd-Frank Act included 
provisions that affected virtually every financial market and amended existing or granted new 
authority and responsibility to nearly every federal financial regulatory agency in the US.15 In 
this case, as in many others internationally after 2008, concerns about public interest 
outweighed debates as to private rights in an environment where the state had to step in to 
salvage the financial sector from the very consequences of the abuse of its private prerogatives. 
Perversely however, while in the 1970s in the USA the wider acceptance of the legitimacy of 
state intervention came with increased scrutiny from the courts, who sought to ameliorate the 
effects of expanding regulatory power through renewed emphasis on rights and due process,16 
the same cannot be said about modern dispute resolution institutions.  
It is argued here that in the current dispute resolution environment, the role of limiting 
the scope of state intervention vis-à-vis private parties is no longer taken up by courts in national 
jurisdictions, but it has been usurped by or entrusted (depending on your viewpoint) to 
investment tribunals in international fora. What we have therefore is a shift since 2008 in both 
                                                 
15  Baird Webel, ‘The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Issues and Summary’, 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress Congressional Research Service, No. R41350, 29 July 
2010, at 3.  
16 Robert Rabin (1983), supra note 8, at 1182. 
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our understanding of regulation (and regulatory capacity) and in our view of the appropriate 
body to safeguard private rights against state incursion. The acceptance of wider regulatory 
capacity (necessary as a response to acute economic crisis, albeit in opposition to a neoliberal 
view of the state) has come with the counterbalance of non-national protection of rights through 
tribunals. The crucial question that arises from the above hypothesis is this: Are tribunals 
capable of determining questions of public interest, and if they are is this a democratically 
acceptable choice? It is to answering this question that the remainder of the paper is devoted to. 
 
4. PUBLIC ISSUES, PRIVATE TRIBUNALS 
 
We have moved a long way from the view of Scrutton LJ in Czarnikow17 where he railed 
against arbitration declaring ‘there must be no Alsatia in England where the King's writ does 
not run’. Perhaps however the very explanation for the appetite for ISDS is its capacity to create 
legal spaces outside the reach of national authorities. From the point of view of business, ISDS 
is a necessary tool in a menu of adjudication options that includes (but is not limited to) national 
courts in any country. While the efficiency of the court systems in developed states is not in 
question, investors may still prefer arbitral tribunals due to their ability to bind governments to 
future commitments, severed from the dangers of democratically mandated changes of course. 
If we are using ISDS in the developed economy context to protect against policy reversals, are 
we using it to set limits to government discretion and by extension democracy? This concern is 
often voiced with anger from NGOs, political parties and activists fighting against the TTIP. 
This part of the paper focuses precisely on these questions.  
 
The problem of public interest issues in ADR 
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The above chart offers a visual representation of the problem of balancing private and 
public interests in a dispute resolution matrix. While public dispute resolution via courts ensures 
public interests are considered, it can be inefficient for parties. On the other hand, privately 
organised dispute resolution has higher chances of being efficient for the users of the services 
(arbitration), but is inefficient in considering wider issues, like the public good. Through their 
power of judicial review, courts have a legitimate capacity to overturn legislative enactments 
that violate important public values. Even if an enactment is not invalidated, the process of 
constitutional adjudication generates a useful dialogue about what kind of political community 
a country aspires to.18 This capacity is absent in tribunals, which are limited by their narrow 
                                                 
17 Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co. [1922] 2 KB 478 (CA), 489. 
18 Dora M. Gruner, ‘Accounting for the Public Interest in International. Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and 
Structural Reform’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2003, 41(3): 923-60, at 929. 
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terms of reference to consideration of treaty provisions (in the case of ISDS) and contractual 
rights. 
Dispute resolution focused on contractually defined rights can lead to tribunals by-
passing public considerations, not due to ideological blindfolds, but due to the narrow terms of 
reference of their appointment. Is this something we ought to be concerned about, or is it 
inherent in the process of private dispute resolution? After all states voluntarily choose to sign 
treaties containing arbitration clauses that limit -as a consequence- sovereignty. Jaffe19 wrote 
that property (of which contract and the right to contract, is an aspect) equips the possessor with 
great powers of exclusion-enforced or sanctioned by the law- not in any way depending on 
consent, and this power to exclude is a source of regulating others’ conduct, either as it 
prescribes complete exclusion or participation on terms. Viewed this way, this is a problem we 
ought to be thinking about in relation to investor-state contracts. In fact, concern about the 
exclusionary power of private deals is nothing new and an issue well explained in the literature. 
For Hale, for instance,20 markets are areas of volitional and not voluntary freedom. He suggests 
that a free market is a legal construct that allows choices within a specified framework that is 
characterised by coercion.21 The exclusionary and relational nature of property means that 
markets allow freedom while at the same time applying coercion. Markets, according to Hale 
(structures of rights that are constituted in particular ways) are therefore sites in which power 
is exercised (structures of mutual coercion). From this perspective, securing existing rights 
through private dispute resolution merely serves to secure very particular structures of power 
rather than to maximise some notion of economic ‘efficiency’. 
It could be argued that international arbitration (of the commercial and investment 
varieties) increasingly addresses the problem of traversing the public/private divide in a move 
of self-constitutionalization. As David Schneiderman has suggested,22 it is not so much the 
constraints of national laws on government powers that determine the shape of the state-market 
relationship currently, but constraints imposed by international legally binding obligations. The 
centrality of private property rights in modern economic organization results in a necessarily 
liberal interpretation of the state–market relationship and leads to an international legal regime 
increasingly geared towards the protection of investor expectations. This is amplified when 
definitions of private rights are found in international treaties, and then protected and enforced 
by private tribunals. 
The following question emerges from the above: Does recourse to arbitration mean that 
matters of public law and the public interest will be ignored by adjudicators who are more at 
home considering private law matters? Can an arbitrator, for instance, legitimately bring human 
rights standards to bear on his or her reading of the contract? If so, what strength should those 
                                                 
19 Louis L. Jaffe, ‘Law Making by Private Groups’, Harvard Law Review, 1937, 51(2): 201-53. 
20 Robert L. Hale, ‘Coersion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’, Political Science Quarterly, 
1923, 38(3): 470-94. 
21 Paddy Ireland, ‘Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory’, Legal Studies, 2003, 23(3): 453-509, 
at 489.  
22 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization Investment Rules and Democracy's Promise 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
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rights be given if they compete with the objectives sought by the agreement?23 According to 
Renner24 arbitral practice gradually establishes a hierarchy of legal norms that integrates both 
transnational and domestic public policy concepts. This hierarchy of norms forms the core of 
an emerging constitutional order beyond the nation-state. This should not be viewed as 
necessarily anti-democratic. However, the possibility of opting out of the domestic legal system 
by way of private agreements raises questions with a view to public-policy concerns. While 
domestic courts are bound to national public policies and constitutions, the status of public 
policy in international arbitration as a private justice system is highly disputed. Thus, the opting 
out of the legal system by private actors going to arbitration may very well entail – or even be 
aimed at – a simultaneous opting out of regulation. Under the conditions of a fierce competition 
between domestic legal systems and alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, there is 
concern that this might lead to a race to the bottom between courts and tribunals with regard to 
public-policy standards. For example, there is already discussion of whether expanding notions 
of what constitutes expropriation (in tribunals) have a dampening effect on state desire to 
regulate.25 Admittedly however the evidence is inconclusive. 
Van Harten cautions26  against arbitrators autonomously resolving core questions of 
public law for reasons of accountability. Whether legislation is discriminatory, whether 
regulation leads to expropriation, whether a court decision is unfair or inequitable is something 
that can be dealt with within a national legal system, but arguably not by a private tribunal. The 
difficulty here is not that these issues cannot be resolved by international adjudication but that 
they will be resolved by a private adjudicator without adequate supervision by public judges. 
This lack of judicial supervision renders the arbitrator's interpretation of public law – itself a 
fundamentally sovereign act – unaccountable in the conventional sense. While it could be 
argued that for instance commercial tribunals are accountable via domestic court supervision, 
the need for judicial deference built into the international system for the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, renders such supervision minimal. Further, there is significantly 
less opportunity for oversight of the work of investment tribunals. Van Harten argues that 
arbitration advocates cannot have it both ways. To be accountable, tribunals must at least be 
subject to judicial review for errors of legal interpretation, as well as errors of jurisdiction and 
procedural impropriety. 
Are we correct then in assuming that a focus on contracts or treaties necessitates 
abandonment of concern for the public good? Leader argues27 that the public law role of the 
arbitrator is easily obscured if one concentrates on those arbitral decisions that have pitted the 
investment contract against external considerations that the contract does not specifically 
include. At that point, the arbitrator has to decide whether he is to be faithful to the document 
                                                 
23  Sheldon Leader, ‘Human rights, risks, and new strategies for global investment’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, 2006, 9(3): 657-705, at 684. 
24 Moritz Renner, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in Transnational Law?’, Journal of International Arbitration, 
2009, 26(4) : 533-55. 
25 Ioannis Glinavos, ‘Investor Protection v. State Regulatory Discretion’, European Journal of Law Reform, 2011, 
13(1): 70-87. 
26 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 156. 
27 See Sheldon Leader, supra note 23, at 686. 
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he is charged with giving effect to, or to cede to the external demands of the state wishing to 
override that agreement. This has happened in those situations28 of direct expropriation via 
nationalization, raising issues concerning appropriate compensation. It is true that in such cases 
arbitrators seem to treat these expropriations as a violation of a commercial contract and do not 
accept the state’s political prerogatives to be relevant to its obligation to respect that agreement. 
One could argue, however, it is not right to see this as the adoption of a private law perspective. 
On the contrary, the primary reason given by arbitrators29 for enforcing stabilization 
clauses is that doing so is good for the country and its people, since otherwise investors would 
not be willing to risk their funds. Developing the ratio from these cases, one could even argue 
that instead of being associated with substantive goals or policies, the public interest is better 
understood as capable of being served through the settlement of the dispute itself, via peaceful, 
orderly, predictable means30. Indeed, one could see arbitration as an integral part of a modern 
system of dispute resolution, and the arbitrator as woven into a general system of law governing 
investor rights and obligations. To paraphrase Judge Lumbard,31 an arbitrator is an instrument 
of national policy, he is not a mere private person, but rather one acting on behalf of the people 
who must take into account public rights. This argument serves to break down the distinction 
between private and public law as regards to dispute resolution. Yet, who entrusts the arbitrator 
with such a role? Why should the public in a democratic polity put its faith on private 
adjudicators? What happens if the people have a different vision of what is in the public interest 
than a neoclassical orthodoxy focused on improving the investment climate? Perhaps the 
independence (or detachment) of arbitrators from the state is what we are seeking by trying to 
insulate judges and courts from politics and political objectives. 
If we consider the independence of courts and judges as a cardinal element of a 
democracy, the greater insulation of judges from the various pressures of power could lead to 
better decision making. Independence provides judges with the opportunity to shape social 
decisions without some of the biases and pressures that distort other institutions.32 If this is true 
of judges, it must also be true for arbitrators, who are twice removed from national centres of 
power. This is a valid argument that requires examination. We do this by moving on to consider 
some contemporary examples of the attitudes of courts and tribunals to decision making when 
the issue involves directly the capacity of a sovereign to determine and pursue actions in the 
public good. 
 
5. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES 
 
                                                 
28 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, YCA 1979, at 177, para. 
55. 
29 Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corp 17 ILM at 1342–43 
30 See Frank J. Sorauf (1957), supra note 2, at 638. 
31 Karl Klare, ‘The Public/Private Distinction in Labour Law’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1982, 
130(6): 1358-422, at 1366. 
32 Neil K. Komesar, ‘Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics and Institutional Choice’, Wisconsin Law Review, 
1997, No 3: 465-74. 
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One way of edging towards an answer to the question of whether tribunals are capable of taking 
into consideration the public good -in ways that approximate the courts- is to consider the 
example of claims relating to sovereign debt restructures. A case in point is Greece. A large 
number of investors in Greek government bonds lost almost half the value of their investment 
when Greece implemented a haircut in 2012 through a Private Sector Involvement (PSI) deal. 
This arrangement which sparked parallel actions in domestic courts and investment tribunals, 
can serve as a good testing ground for an assessment of arguments based on public interest in 
different dispute resolution fora. We first look at actions in the national courts. 
Once it became obvious that the Greek government did not intend to offer any relief to 
small-holders, 7000 of them joined a class suit against Greece arguing expropriation under the 
Greek Constitution and violations of Human Rights provisions under the European Convention 
of Human Rights. These arguments were tested in the Greek Council of State33 in March 2013 
and were rejected, with the court arguing that any losses were not due to a state act and finding 
no violations of Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR).34 Foremost in the Court’s thinking was the belief that Greece was battling a national 
emergency, taking measures in the public interest. This is consistent with the way other courts 
have dealt with the issue of expropriation. The general principles to be applied in determining 
whether or not there has been a violation of Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR were set out 
in James v United Kingdom.35 The judgement of national authorities on whether an alleged 
taking of property was in the public interest will be respected unless it was manifestly without 
reasonable foundation. It is also examined whether a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
exists between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised, meaning that a fair 
balance must be struck between the demands of the general interests of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. The balance would not 
be fair if the applicant had to bear an individual and excessive burden, according to the court in 
James. Further, while the taking of property without payment reasonably related to its value 
would normally constitute a disproportionate interference, this should not be interpreted as 
requiring the state to compensate for all actions affecting property entitlements. Only claimants 
arguing for deprivation of possessions will be entitled to compensation, and the threshold for 
such a finding is a high one as the measure in question must completely remove any economic 
value from the affected right36. In the PSI case, the Greek court concluded that the loss resulting 
from the haircut, while significant, did not reach the threshold required for deprivation to be 
established. The Court also found that a claim of expropriation under a Germany-Greece 1961 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), as argued by some claimants, was not established for the 
same reasons. 
Would an investment tribunal reach the same conclusion, affording the same deference 
to national authorities and their interpretation of what is in the public interest? It is argued here 
                                                 
33 Decision 1116-1117/2014 (21.3.14) of the Greek Council of State, (Συμβούλιο Της Επικρατείας). 
34 Ioannis Glinavos, ‘A New Era in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Arbitrating the European Crisis’, Corporate 
Disputes, 2015, Issue 1: 60-4.  
35 James v United Kingdom, 1986, 8 EHRR 123. 
36 See Ioannis Glinavos (2011), supra note 25, at 80. 
MJIEL Vol. 13 Iss. 1 2016                                      Ioannis Glinavos 
255 
that the national emergency argument that was so convincing to the Greek Court may be less 
so to a tribunal. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for instance, has stated 37  that 
international law admits that a fundamental change in the circumstances which determined the 
parties to accept a treaty, if it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the 
obligations imposed by it, may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground for 
invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty. One of the basic requirements is that the 
change of circumstances must have been a fundamental one, meaning that changes of 
circumstances must imperil the existence or vital development of the state. In light of these 
stringent standards, it is very rare for international tribunals to grant relief to a treaty party on 
the basis of a fundamental change of circumstances, such as a national economic emergency, 
as Argentina discovered to its detriment in its post default arbitrations. An ICSID Tribunal in 
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina38 argued for instance that it did not have jurisdiction 
over measures of general economic policy adopted by a nation state and could not pass 
judgement on whether they are right or wrong. This finding links with the argument made 
earlier that it is not the lack of a desire to consider notions of public interest, but the different 
terms of reference of tribunals that preclude them from doing so. It seems that while a national 
court may have a certain perspective of the gravity of a national calamity, the same cannot be 
said of an investment tribunal. 
The focus on treaty rights leads to the general acceptance of the fact that expropriations 
outside the scope of a state’s police powers (referring to public health, safety and welfare) will 
entail an obligation to compensate, notwithstanding the public interest considerations behind 
the state’s action or the fact that such action is lawful. In Cia del Desarollo de Santa Elena SA 
v Republic of Costa Rica39 the tribunal decided that the public purpose (in this case protecting 
the environment) for which the property was taken does not alter the legal character of the 
taking for which adequate compensation must be paid. The tribunal then went on to state that 
expropriatory environmental measures are similar to any other expropriatory measures that a 
state may take in order to implement its policies. The tribunal concluded that where property is 
expropriated, even for purposes, (mandated by domestic or international policies), the state’s 
obligation to pay compensation remains; a conclusion at odds with court decisions on similar 
matters that offer a wider scope for discretion40. 
Yet, a perception of tribunals as solely focused on private rights to the exclusion of all 
else is not universally borne out by the evidence. To return to the Greek example, a recent 
ICSID decision on jurisdiction41 to hear a PSI related claim showed that tribunals will not 
always accept to hear the substantive claims, and will not always be happy to expand definitions 
of private rights to the detriment of sovereign discretion. The tribunal argued that they should 
not lightly expand the language of a treaty so as to extend protections, where there is no 
indication that the State parties intended to do so. The tribunal went on to conclude that neither 
                                                 
37 United Kingdom v. Iceland, 2/2/1973 
38 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina (ICSID ARB/01/8). 
39 Cia del Desarollo de Santa Elena SA v Republic of Costa Rica (2000) 15 ICSID Rev 169. 
40 Ioannis Glinavos (2011), supra note 25, at 75 
41 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic (ICSID ARB/13/8). 
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of the claimants against Greece was an investor with an investment as defined in the relevant 
BITs. We will soon have more opportunity to see whether court and tribunal views of the 
appropriateness of state responses to economic emergency converge as more cases have been 
lodged with ICSID challenging Greece’s recent actions, including the PSI deal42. The author is 
not optimistic however that tribunals will significantly diverge from the earlier precedents of 




The discussion in this paper suggests that some sort of public law role is inevitable for tribunals 
-in both investment and commercial arbitrations- but how is it to be achieved? Arbitration is a 
fact of life and a core component of a modern and efficient system of dispute resolution, 
anywhere in the world. Arbitration can provide a route around institutional inefficiencies in 
developing states and can promote a healthy investment climate and policy sustainability in 
developed ones. The acceptance of arbitration as a positive inclusion to our menu of dispute 
resolution options however does not change the fact that some aspects of decision making, 
especially those with a public element, are not addressed adequately. How can we ensure that 
arbitration can stay relevant and help parties resolve disputes effectively without undermining 
the notions of transparency, legitimacy and democratic accountability that we hold dear? 
This paper demonstrates that a lot of resistance to arbitration in general -and investor 
arbitration in particular- is ill-informed, or in any case based on brittle empirical bases. 
Nonetheless, there is no escaping the juridical truth that while courts have within their terms of 
reference the capacity to consider notions of public interest, arbitral tribunals do not. The 
discussion leads to the conclusion that concern about corroding effects of arbitral expansion on 
perceptions of legitimacy and sovereign discretion should be taken seriously. Unchecked 
growth in private dispute resolution can threaten perceptions of legitimacy and democratic 
accountability. This can take place long before sovereign discretion is limited beyond the point 
that states can determine and defend notions of the public good. This paper arrives at this 
conclusion resting on a methodological acceptance of the role of the state as the legitimate 
interpreter of notions of the public good, indeed the argument here accepts there can be such a 
thing as a public good. This may entail a rejection of the more extreme strands of economic 
theory, but it is widely shared43. 
If we accept arbitral decision making as a fact of life and seek to protect its presence in 
the domain of dispute resolution, how can we simultaneously protect state sovereignty in 
determining the public interest and defending public goods? Commercial arbitration in this 
respect does not present us with great problems. Truly de-localised arbitration is a rarity, with 
most tribunals operating within a framework of law as determined by the seat of arbitration and 
national statutes. The concern is in the field of investment arbitration. In that domain, one 
solution would be to insert a public law role that protects regulatory discretion through revision 
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of BITs, or via creating an investment court that can ensure transparent checks and balances on 
arbitral decision making. This is precisely the motivation behind the European Commission’s 
proposal for an Investment Court to oversee ISDS under the proposed TTIP44. Could this work? 
Considering the above discussion, yes it could, but at a high cost, risking robbing both the 
arbitral process of its advantages, and states of their discretion. 
There is a much simpler solution. This could be the continued promotion of alternative 
dispute resolution and arbitration in the commercial field, with a simultaneous scaling back of 
investment arbitration in agreements between developed economies. The literature on the 
benefits of ISDS is perhaps convincing for deals between corporates and developing nations 
with weak judicial institutions. It is less convincing in the context of developed states. Inserting 
an ISDS clause in the TTIP can only have one purpose, restricting sovereign discretion in order 
to ensure policy consistency, regardless of the effects this can have on democracy, 
accountability, transparency. There is no reason to reinvent the wheel through an investment 
court in order to allow tribunals to wade into cross-Atlantic disputes. Our respective court 
systems (USA and EU) are perfectly capable of doing that, and keep definitions of the public 
interest within established juridical frontiers. Is this retrograde? Don’t we have agreement on 
the our basic commercial aspirations and a common understanding on the role of dispute 
resolution between the USA and Europe? This paper argues that we do not. If we do, for 
example, share views on the appropriateness of private dispute resolution universally, why does 
the USA embrace mandatory consumer arbitration clauses45, while Europe shudders in horror 
at their mention?  
We can conclude by reinforcing the point that unchecked growth in private dispute 
resolution can threaten perceptions of legitimacy, transparency and democratic accountability. 
We should protect sovereign discretion so that national courts can still determine and defend 
notions of the public good. This does not make us enemies of arbitration, modernity, capitalism. 
It just makes us prudent. 
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